



Linux-Foundation

Exam Questions KCSA

Kubernetes and Cloud Native Security Associate (KCSA)

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NEW QUESTION 1

Which standard approach to security is augmented by the 4C??s of Cloud Native security?

- A. Zero Trust
- B. Least Privilege
- C. Defense-in-Depth
- D. Secure-by-Design

Answer: C

Explanation:

➤ The 4C??s model (Cloud, Cluster, Container, Code) is presented in the official Kubernetes documentation as a layered model that explicitly maps to defense-in-depth.

➤ Exact extracts from Kubernetes docs (security overview):

➤ ??The 4C??s of Cloud Native Security are Cloud, Clusters, Containers, and Code.??

➤ ??You can think of the 4C??s as a layered approach to security; applying security measures at each layer reduces risk.??

➤ ??This layered approach is commonly known as defense in depth.??

References:

Kubernetes Docs — Security overview #The 4C??s of Cloud Native Security: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/overview/#the-4cs-of-cloud-native-security>

NEW QUESTION 2

Given a standard Kubernetes cluster architecture comprising a single control plane node (hosting both the control plane as Pods) and three worker nodes, which of the following data flows crosses a trust boundary?

- A. From kubelet to Container Runtime
- B. From kubelet to API Server
- C. From kubelet to Controller Manager
- D. From API Server to Container Runtime

Answer: B

Explanation:

➤ Trust boundaries exist where data flows between different security domains.

➤ In Kubernetes:

➤ Communication between the kubelet (node agent) and the API Server (control plane) crosses the node-to-control-plane trust boundary.

➤ (A) Kubelet to container runtime is local, no boundary crossing.

➤ (C) Kubelet does not communicate directly with the controller manager.

➤ (D) API server does not talk directly to the container runtime; it delegates to kubelet.

➤ Therefore, (B) is the correct trust boundary crossing flow.

References:

CNCF Security Whitepaper – Kubernetes Threat Model: identifies node-to-control-plane communications (kubelet # API Server) as crossing trust boundaries.
Kubernetes Documentation – Cluster Architecture

NEW QUESTION 3

A cluster is failing to pull more recent versions of images from k8s.gcr.io. Why may this be?

- A. There is a network connectivity issue between the cluster and k8s.gcr.io.
- B. There is a bug in the container runtime or the image pull process.
- C. The authentication credentials for accessing k8s.gcr.io are incorrectly scoped.
- D. The container image registry k8s.gcr.io has been deprecated.

Answer: D

Explanation:

➤ k8s.gcr.io was the historic Kubernetes image registry.

➤ It has been deprecated and replaced with registry.k8s.io.

➤ Exact extract (Kubernetes Blog):

➤ ??The k8s.gcr.io image registry will be frozen from April 3, 2023 and fully deprecated. All Kubernetes project images are now served from registry.k8s.io.??

➤ Pulling newer versions from k8s.gcr.io fails because the registry no longer receives updates.

References:

NEW QUESTION 4

In a Kubernetes cluster, what are the security risks associated with using ConfigMaps for storing secrets?

- A. Storing secrets in ConfigMaps does not allow for fine-grained access control via RBAC.
- B. Storing secrets in ConfigMaps can expose sensitive information as they are stored in plaintext and can be accessed by unauthorized users.
- C. Using ConfigMaps for storing secrets might make applications incompatible with the Kubernetes cluster.
- D. ConfigMaps store sensitive information in etcd encoded in base64 format automatically, which does not ensure confidentiality of data.

Answer: B

Explanation:

- ConfigMaps are explicitly not for confidential data.
- Exact extract (ConfigMap concept): "A ConfigMap is an API object used to store non-confidential data in key-value pairs."
- Exact extract (ConfigMap concept): "ConfigMaps are not intended to hold confidential data. Use a Secret for confidential data."
- Why this is risky: data placed into a ConfigMap is stored as regular (plaintext) string values in the API and etcd (unless you deliberately use binaryData for base64 content you supply). That means if someone has read access to the namespace or to etcd/API Server storage, they can view the values.
- Secrets vs ConfigMaps (to clarify distractor D):
- Exact extract (Secret concept): "By default, secret data is stored as unencrypted base64-encoded strings. You can enable encryption at rest to protect Secrets stored in etcd."
- This base64 behavior applies to Secrets, not to ConfigMap data. Thus option D is incorrect for ConfigMaps.
- About RBAC (to clarify distractor A): Kubernetes does support fine-grained RBAC for both ConfigMaps and Secrets; the issue isn't lack of RBAC but that ConfigMaps are not designed for confidential material.
- About compatibility (to clarify distractor C): Using ConfigMaps for secrets doesn't make apps "incompatible"; it's simply insecure and against guidance. [References: , Kubernetes Docs — ConfigMaps: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/configmap/>, Kubernetes Docs — Secrets: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/secret/>, Kubernetes Docs — Encrypting Secret Data at Rest: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/administer-cluster/encrypt-data/>, Note: The citations above are from the official Kubernetes documentation and reflect the stated guidance that ConfigMaps are for non-confidential data, while Secrets (with encryption at rest enabled) are for confidential data, and that the 4C's map to defense in depth.,]

NEW QUESTION 5

An attacker has successfully overwhelmed the Kubernetes API server in a cluster with a single control plane node by flooding it with requests. How would implementing a high-availability mode with multiple control plane nodes mitigate this attack?

- A. By implementing network segmentation to isolate the API server from the rest of the cluster, preventing the attack from spreading.
- B. By distributing the workload across multiple API servers, reducing the load on each server.
- C. By increasing the resources allocated to the API server, allowing it to handle a higher volume of requests.
- D. By implementing rate limiting and throttling mechanisms on the API server to restrict the number of requests allowed.

Answer: B

Explanation:

- In high-availability clusters, multiple API server instances run behind a load balancer.
- This distributes client requests across multiple API servers, preventing a single API server from being overwhelmed.
- Exact extract (Kubernetes Docs – High Availability Clusters):
"A highly available control plane runs multiple instances of kube-apiserver, typically fronted by a load balancer, so that if one instance fails or is overloaded, others continue serving requests."
- Other options clarified:
A: Network segmentation does not directly mitigate API server DoS.
C: Adding resources helps, but doesn't solve single-point-of-failure.
D: Rate limiting is a valid mitigation but not provided by HA alone.
[References: , Kubernetes Docs — Building High-Availability Clusters: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/setup/production-environment/tools/kubeadm/high-availability/>,]

NEW QUESTION 6

In the event that kube-proxy is in a CrashLoopBackOff state, what impact does it have on the Pods running on the same worker node?

- A. The Pods cannot communicate with other Pods in the cluster.
- B. The Pod cannot mount persistent volumes through CSI drivers.
- C. The Pod's security context restrictions cannot be enforced.
- D. The Pod's resource utilization increases significantly.

Answer: A

Explanation:

kube-proxy manages cluster network routing rules (via iptables or IPVS). It enables Pods to communicate with Services and Pods across nodes. If kube-proxy fails (CrashLoopBackOff), service IP routing and cluster-wide pod-to-pod networking breaks. Local Pod-to-Pod communication within the same node may still work, but cross-node communication fails.

Exact extract (Kubernetes Docs – kube-proxy):

"kube-proxy maintains network rules on nodes. These rules allow network communication to Pods from network sessions inside or outside of the cluster."

[References:, Kubernetes Docs — kube-proxy: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/command-line-tools-reference/kube-proxy/>,]

NEW QUESTION 7

Which of the following statements correctly describes a container breakout?

- A. A container breakout is the process of escaping the container and gaining access to the Pod's network traffic.
- B. A container breakout is the process of escaping a container when it reaches its resource limits.
- C. A container breakout is the process of escaping the container and gaining access to the cloud provider's infrastructure.
- D. A container breakout is the process of escaping the container and gaining access to the host operating system.

Answer: D

Explanation:

Container breakout refers to an attacker escaping container isolation and reaching the host OS.

Once the host is compromised, the attacker can access other containers, Kubernetes nodes, or escalate further.

Exact extract (Kubernetes Security Docs):

??If an attacker gains access to a container, they may attempt a container breakout to gain access to the host system.??



Other options clarified:

A: Network access inside a Pod ≠ breakout.

B: Resource exhaustion is a DoS, not a breakout.

C: Cloud infrastructure compromise is possible after host compromise, but not the definition of breakout.

References:

Kubernetes Security Concepts: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/>

CNCF Security Whitepaper (Threats section): <https://github.com/cncf/tag-security>

NEW QUESTION 8

A Kubernetes cluster tenant can launch privileged Pods in contravention of the restricted Pod Security Standard mandated for cluster tenants and enforced by the built-in PodSecurity admission controller.

The tenant has full CRUD permissions on the namespace object and the namespaced resources. How did the tenant achieve this?

- A. The scope of the tenant role means privilege escalation is impossible.
- B. By tampering with the namespace labels.
- C. By deleting the PodSecurity admission controller deployment running in their namespace.
- D. By using higher-level access credentials obtained reading secrets from another namespace.

Answer: B

Explanation:

The PodSecurity admission controller enforces Pod Security Standards (Baseline, Restricted, Privileged) based on namespace labels.

If a tenant has full CRUD on the namespace object, they can modify the namespace label to remove or weaken the restriction (e.g., setting `pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=privileged`).

This allows privileged Pods to be admitted despite the security policy.



Incorrect options:

(A) is false — namespace-level access allows tampering.

(C) is invalid — PodSecurity admission is not namespace-deployed, it's a cluster-wide admission controller.

(D) is unrelated — Secrets from other namespaces wouldn't directly bypass PodSecurity enforcement.

References:

Kubernetes Documentation – Pod Security Admission

CNCF Security Whitepaper – Admission control and namespace-level policy enforcement weaknesses.

NEW QUESTION 9

Which of the following statements on static Pods is true?

- A. The kubelet can run static Pods that span multiple nodes, provided that it has the necessary privileges from the API server.
- B. The kubelet can run a maximum of 5 static Pods on each node.
- C. The kubelet schedules static Pods local to its node without going through the kube-scheduler, making tracking and managing them difficult.
- D. The kubelet only deploys static Pods when the kube-scheduler is unresponsive.

Answer: C

Explanation:

Static Pods are managed directly by the kubelet on each node.

They are not scheduled by the kube-scheduler and always remain bound to the node where they are defined.

Exact extract (Kubernetes Docs – Static Pods):

??Static Pods are managed directly by the kubelet daemon on a specific node, without the API server. They do not go through the Kubernetes scheduler.??



Clarifications:

A: Static Pods do not span multiple nodes.

B: No hard limit of 5 Pods per node.

D: They are not a fallback mechanism; kubelet always manages them regardless of scheduler state.

References:

Kubernetes Docs — Static Pods: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/static-pod/>

NEW QUESTION 10

As a Kubernetes and Cloud Native Security Associate, a user can set up audit logging in a cluster. What is the risk of logging every event at the

fullRequestResponselevel?

- A. No risk, as it provides the most comprehensive audit trail.
- B. Increased storage requirements and potential impact on performance.
- C. Improved security and easier incident investigation.
- D. Reduced storage requirements and faster performance.

Answer: B

Explanation:

Audit logging records API server requests and responses for security monitoring. The RequestResponse level logs the full request and response bodies, which can: Significantly increase storage and performance overhead. Potentially log sensitive data (including Secrets). Therefore, while comprehensive, it introduces risks of performance degradation and excessive log volume. References: Kubernetes Documentation – Auditing CNCF Security Whitepaper – Logging and monitoring: trade-offs between verbosity, storage, and security.

NEW QUESTION 10

When should soft multitenancy be used over hard multitenancy?

- A. When the priority is enabling resource sharing and efficiency between tenants.
- B. When the priority is enabling complete isolation between tenants.
- C. When the priority is enabling fine-grained control over tenant resources.
- D. When the priority is enabling strict security boundaries between tenants.

Answer: A

Explanation:

Soft multitenancy (Namespaces, RBAC, Network Policies) # assumes some level of trust between tenants, focuses on resource sharing and efficiency. Hard multitenancy (separate clusters or strong virtualization) # strict isolation, used when tenants are untrusted. Exact extract (CNCF TAG Security Multi-Tenancy Whitepaper): ?? Soft multi-tenancy refers to multiple workloads running in the same cluster with some trust assumptions. It provides resource sharing and operational efficiency. Hard multi-tenancy requires stronger isolation guarantees, typically separate clusters. ?? References: CNCF Security TAG — Multi-Tenancy Whitepaper: <https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/tree/main/multi-tenancy>

NEW QUESTION 15

In which order are the validating and mutating admission controllers run while the Kubernetes API server processes a request?

- A. The order of execution varies and is determined by the cluster configuration.
- B. Validating admission controllers run before mutating admission controllers.
- C. Validating and mutating admission controllers run simultaneously.
- D. Mutating admission controllers run before validating admission controllers.

Answer: D

Explanation:

The admission control flow in Kubernetes: Mutating admission controllers run first and can modify incoming requests. Validating admission controllers run after mutations to ensure the final object complies with policies. This ensures policies validate the final, mutated object. References: Kubernetes Documentation – Admission Controllers CNCF Security Whitepaper – Admission control workflow.

NEW QUESTION 17

Which of the following statements best describe container image signing and verification in the cloud environment?

- A. Container image signatures and their verification ensure their authenticity and integrity against tampering.
- B. Container image signatures are concerned with defining developer ownership of applications within multi-tenant environments.
- C. Container image signatures are mandatory in cloud environments, as cloud providers would deny the execution of unsigned container images.
- D. Container image signatures affect the performance of containerized applications, as they increase the size of images with additional metadata.

Answer: A

Explanation:

Image signing (with Notary, cosign, or similar tools) ensures that images are from a trusted source and have not been modified. Exact extract (Sigstore cosign docs): ?? Cosign allows you to sign and verify container images to ensure authenticity and integrity. ?? Why others are wrong: B: Ownership can be inferred but it's about authenticity & integrity not tenancy. C: Not mandatory; enforcement requires admission controllers. D: Metadata size is negligible and has no runtime performance impact. References: Sigstore Project: <https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview> CNCF Security Whitepaper

NEW QUESTION 20

Which label should be added to the Namespace to block any privileged Pods from being created in that Namespace?

- A. privileged: false
- B. privileged: true
- C. pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: baseline
- D. pod.security.kubernetes.io/privileged: false

Answer: C

Explanation:

Kubernetes Pod Security Admission (PSA) enforces Pod Security Standards by applying labels on Namespaces.

Exact extract (Kubernetes Docs – Pod Security Admission):

??You can label a namespace with pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: baseline to enforce the Baseline policy.??

The baseline profile explicitly disallows privileged pods and other unsafe features.

Why others are wrong:

A & D: These labels do not exist in Kubernetes.

B: Setting privileged: true would allow privileged pods, not block them.

References:

Kubernetes Docs — Pod Security Admission: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-admission/>

Kubernetes Docs — Pod Security Standards: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/>

NEW QUESTION 23

How do Kubernetes namespaces impact the application of policies when using Pod Security Admission?

- A. Namespaces are ignored; Pod Security Admission policies apply cluster-wide only.
- B. Different policies can be applied to specific namespaces.
- C. Each namespace can have only one active policy.
- D. The default namespace enforces the strictest security policies by default.

Answer: B

Explanation:

Pod Security Admission (PSA) enforces policies by applying labels on namespaces, not globally across the cluster.

Exact extract (Kubernetes Docs – Pod Security Admission):

??You can apply Pod Security Standards to namespaces by adding labels such as pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce. Different namespaces can enforce different policies.??

Clarifications:

A: Incorrect, namespaces are the unit of enforcement.

C: Misleading — a namespace can have multiple enforcement modes (enforce, audit, warn).

D: Default namespace does not enforce strict policies unless labeled.

References:

Kubernetes Docs — Pod Security Admission: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-admission/>

NEW QUESTION 25

An attacker compromises a Pod and attempts to use its service account token to escalate privileges within the cluster. Which Kubernetes security feature is designed to limit what this service account can do?

- A. PodSecurity admission
- B. NetworkPolicy
- C. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
- D. RuntimeClass

Answer: C

Explanation:

When a Pod is created, Kubernetes automatically mounts a service account token that can authenticate to the API server.

The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) system defines what actions a service account can perform.

By carefully restricting Roles and RoleBindings, administrators limit the blast radius of a compromised Pod.

Incorrect options:

(A) PodSecurity admission enforces workload-level security settings but does not control API access.

(B) NetworkPolicy controls network communication, not API privileges.

(D) RuntimeClass selects container runtimes, unrelated to privilege escalation through API tokens.

References:

Kubernetes Documentation – Using RBAC Authorization

CNCF Security Whitepaper – Identity & Access Management: limiting lateral movement by constraining service account permissions.

NEW QUESTION 30

Which security knowledge-base focuses specifically on offensive tools, techniques, and procedures?

- A. MITRE ATT&CK
- B. OWASP Top 10
- C. CIS Controls
- D. NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Answer: A

Explanation:

MITRE ATT&CK is a globally recognized knowledge base of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). It is focused on describing offensive behaviors attackers use.

Incorrect options:

(B) OWASP Top 10 highlights common application vulnerabilities, not attacker techniques.

(C) CIS Controls are defensive best practices, not offensive tools.

(D) NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides a risk-based defensive framework, not adversary TTPs.

References:

MITRE ATT&CK Framework

CNCF Security Whitepaper – Threat intelligence section: references MITRE ATT&CK for describing attacker behavior.

NEW QUESTION 34

What is the purpose of an egress NetworkPolicy?

A. To control the incoming network traffic to a Kubernetes cluster.

B. To control the outbound network traffic from a Kubernetes cluster.

C. To secure the Kubernetes cluster against unauthorized access.

D. To control the outgoing network traffic from one or more Kubernetes Pods.

Answer: D

Explanation:

NetworkPolicy controls network traffic at the Pod level.

Ingress rules: control incoming connections to Pods.

Egress rules: control outgoing connections from Pods.

Exact extract (Kubernetes Docs – Network Policies):

"An egress rule controls outgoing connections from Pods that match the policy."

Clarifying wrong answers:

A/B: Too broad (cluster-level); policies apply per Pod/Namespace.

C: Security against unauthorized access is broader than egress policies.

[References:, Kubernetes Docs — Network Policies: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/network-policies/>,]

NEW QUESTION 38

You are responsible for securing the kubelet component in a Kubernetes cluster.

Which of the following statements about kubelet security is correct?

A. Kubelet runs as a privileged container by default.

B. Kubelet does not have any built-in security features.

C. Kubelet supports TLS authentication and encryption for secure communication with the API server.

D. Kubelet requires root access to interact with the host system.

Answer: C

Explanation:

The kubelet is the primary agent that runs on each node in a Kubernetes cluster and communicates with the control plane.

Kubelet supports TLS (Transport Layer Security) for both authentication and encryption when interacting with the API server. This is a core security feature that ensures secure node-to-control-plane communication.

Incorrect options:

(A) Kubelet does not run as a privileged container by default; it runs as a system process (typically systemd-managed) on the host.

(B) Kubelet does include built-in security features such as TLS authentication, authorization modes, and read-only vs secured ports.

(D) While kubelet interacts with the host system (e.g., cgroups, container runtimes), it does not inherently require root access for communication security; RBAC and TLS handle authentication.

[References:, Kubernetes Documentation – Kubelet authentication/authorization, CNCF Security Whitepaper – Cluster Component Security (discusses TLS and mutual authentication between kubelet and API server).,]

NEW QUESTION 43

How can a user enforce the Pod Security Standard without third-party tools?

A. Through implementing Kyverno or OPA Policies.

B. Use the PodSecurity admission controller.

C. It is only possible to enforce the Pod Security Standard with additional tools within the cloud native ecosystem.

D. No additional measures have to be taken to enforce the Pod Security Standard.

Answer: B

Explanation:

The PodSecurity admission controller (built-in as of Kubernetes v1.23+) enforces the Pod Security Standards (Privileged, Baseline, Restricted).

Enforcement is namespace-scoped and configured through namespace labels.

Incorrect options:

(A) Kyverno/OPA are external policy tools (useful but not required).

(C) Not true, PodSecurity admission provides native enforcement.

(D) Enforcement requires explicit configuration, not automatic.

[References:, Kubernetes Documentation – Pod Security Admission, CNCF Security Whitepaper – Policy enforcement and admission control.,]

NEW QUESTION 47

What is Grafana?

A. A cloud-native distributed tracing system for monitoring microservices architectures.

B. A container orchestration platform for managing and scaling applications.

C. A platform for monitoring and visualizing time-series data.

D. A cloud-native security tool for scanning and detecting vulnerabilities in Kubernetes clusters.

Answer: C

Explanation:

Grafana: An open-source analytics and visualization platform widely used with Prometheus, Loki, etc.

Exact extract (Grafana Docs): ??Grafana is the open-source analytics and monitoring solution for every database. It allows you to query, visualize, alert on, and understand your metrics no matter where they are stored.??

A is wrong: That describes Jaeger (distributed tracing).

B is wrong: That ??s Kubernetes itself.

D is wrong: That ??s Trivy/Aqua/Prismatypetools.

References:

Grafana Docs: <https://grafana.com/docs/grafana/latest/>

NEW QUESTION 52

What is the purpose of the Supplier Assessments and Reviews control in the NIST 800-53 Rev. 5 set of controls for Supply Chain Risk Management?

- A. To evaluate and monitor existing suppliers for adherence to security requirements.
- B. To conduct regular audits of suppliers' financial performance.
- C. To establish contractual agreements with suppliers.
- D. To identify potential suppliers for the organization.

Answer: A

Explanation:

In NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, SR-6: Supplier Assessments and Reviews requires evaluating and monitoring suppliers' security and risk practices.

Exact extract (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, SR-6):

"The organization assesses and monitors suppliers to ensure they are meeting the security requirements specified in contracts and agreements."

This is about ongoing monitoring of supplier adherence, not financial audits, not contract creation, and not supplier discovery.

References:

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, Control SR-6 (Supplier Assessments and Reviews): <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53/rev-5/final>

NEW QUESTION 56

By default, in a Kubeadm cluster, which authentication methods are enabled?

- A. OIDC, Bootstrap tokens, and Service Account Tokens
- B. X509 Client Certs, OIDC, and Service Account Tokens
- C. X509 Client Certs, Bootstrap Tokens, and Service Account Tokens
- D. X509 Client Certs, Webhook Authentication, and Service Account Tokens

Answer: C

Explanation:

In a kubeadm cluster, by default the API server enables several authentication mechanisms:

X509 Client Certs: Used for authenticating kubelets, admins, and control-plane components.

Bootstrap Tokens: Temporary credentials used for node bootstrap/joining clusters.

Service Account Tokens: Used by workloads in pods to authenticate with the API server.

Exact extract (Kubernetes Docs – Authentication):

"Kubernetes uses client certificates, bearer tokens, an authenticating proxy, or HTTP basic auth to authenticate API requests."

"Bootstrap tokens are a simple bearer token that is meant to be used when creating new clusters or joining new nodes to an existing cluster."

"Service accounts are special accounts that provide an identity for processes that run in a Pod."

References:

Kubernetes Docs — Authentication: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/>

Kubeadm — TLS Bootstrapping: <https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/bootstrap-tokens/>

NEW QUESTION 58

Which of the following is a control for Supply Chain Risk Management according to NIST 800-53 Rev. 5?

- A. Access Control
- B. System and Communications Protection
- C. Supply Chain Risk Management Plan
- D. Incident Response

Answer: C

NEW QUESTION 61

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